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A small committee has to approve/reject a project with uncertain return. Members  have 
different preferences: some are value-maximizers, others are biased towards approval. We 
focus on the efficient use of scarce information when communication is not guaranteed, and 
we provide insights on the optimal committee composition. We show that the presence of 
biased members can improve the voting outcome by simplifying the strategies of unbiased 
members. Thus, heterogeneous committees perform at least  as well as homogeneous 
committees. In particular, when value-maximizers outnumber biased members by one vote, 
the optimal equilibrium becomes unique. Finally, allowing members to communicate brings 
no improvement. 
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 1 Introduction
In many committees, members are nominated by (and thus represent the interests of) diﬀerent
institutions and this reﬂects in diﬀerent voting behaviors. Consider, for instance, boards
of directors whose objective, in principle, is to maximize ﬁrm value. Directors represent
diﬀerent stakeholders, (majority and minority shareholders, investors, workers, etc.) whose
objectives may not be aligned. Another example1 is provided by monetary policy committees,
where some members are chosen within the staﬀ of the central bank while other members
are appointed by external bodies, such as the Government (the Bank of England Monetary
Policy Committee is a typical example). In this case, internal members are usually more
concerned about inﬂation while external members are more concerned about unemployment.
In general, empirical studies show that members belonging to diﬀerent groups have signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in their voting behaviors and that these diﬀerences can be explained by factors
such as political pressure or the channel of appointment, especially when committee members
face retention decisions (see, for example, Sheperd [2009], and Harris, Levine and Spencer
[2011]).
The present paper analyzes the eﬀect of member heterogeneity by studying the voting
behavior of a small committee that has to approve or reject a project. We consider two types
of players: expected value maximizers and biased members who always vote in favor of the
project, even disregarding their private information. Then, the following question arises: why
should biased members be allowed on this committee? Our model shows that their presence is
never detrimental, and is beneﬁcial in the absence of communication among members because
it ensures uniqueness and optimality of the equilibrium strategy proﬁle. The intuition is that
the bias provides certainty about some members’ strategies thus simplifying the responses
of the others, and therefore reducing the number of (otherwise) multiple equilibria. In par-
ticular, we explore the behavior of uninformed value-maximizing members. Given that they
want to maximize the probability that the committee makes the correct decision, they face
the question of how to avoid inﬂuencing the decision and let informed members determine
it. The equilibrium voting strategies prescribe that uninformed unbiased members systemat-
ically contrast the vote of biased members. Indeed, in many small committees dissent voting
is commonly observed (Spencer [2006]). On the basis of the equilibrium voting strategies, we
determine the optimal composition of the committee, consisting in letting unbiased members
outnumber biased members by just one vote. Our result is consistent with the actual com-
position of some committees such as the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee or
the Italian Constitutional Court. Finally, our model provides some suggestions on the role
1Additional examples are special juries as Supreme or Constitutional Courts, and technical committees,
where politicians, bureaucrats and experts meet to provide advice.
2of communication in the voting process.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the main literature. Section 3 presents
the basic model. Section 4 examines, as a benchmark, the voting game in a committee
composed only of value-maximizing members. Section 5 introduces biased members and
analyzes if and how results change when members have diﬀerent objectives. Then, in Section
6 we allow members to communicate. Finally, Section 7 concludes. All proofs are collected
in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
Since Condorcet’s seminal contribution, namely his Jury Theorem, the literature about voting
has been constantly growing. A lot of papers have generalized the Jury Theorem2, and many
others have extended voting games to include both naive and strategic voting3.
Traditionally, in this literature the aim of voters has been to aggregate information, with
the assumption that taking the right decision (that is, guessing the correct state of the
world) was the common objective of all the players. In fact, we believe this is not the case,
as heterogeneity of preferences is well documented both in large and in small elections4.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1996; 1997] have focused on heterogeneity in large elections,
showing that full information aggregation is still possible. In particular, they show that the
probability of electing the “wrong” candidate asymptotically goes to zero.
In small committees, the presence of heterogeneity and (possible) resulting conﬂicts of
interests appear to be a more relevant problem, as information aggregation may be severely
limited by strategic voting induced by divergent interests. One possibility is to look for op-
timal voting rules to minimize information losses. In a standard Condorcet Jury Theorem
framework, Chwe [1999] suggests to provide minority members with optimal incentives to
participate in voting, thus not wasting their information. But things become more compli-
cated when the relevant issue is not to ﬁnd optimal voting rules but rather an optimal way to
aggregate “relevant” information5. Li, Rosen and Suen [2001] examine a two-person commit-
tee where each member receives a private signal and reports his information. Since members
2See, for instance, Duggan and Martinelli [2001], Myerson [1998] and McLennan [1998]. See also Piketty
[1999] for a brief review of recent contributions about the information-aggregation role of political institutions.
3See Austen-Smith and Banks [1996] and an experiment on the use of strategic voting by Eckel and Holt
[1989].
4See for instance Blinder [2006], Jung [2011], Riboni and Ruge-Murcia [2007] for the case on Monetary
Policy Committees.
5Berk and Bierut [2004] suggest that often in small committees it is technologically or politically unfeasible
to implement optimal voting rules, thus binding voting to be based on simple majority.
3have conﬂicting interests, strategic considerations induce information misreporting and there
is no truth-telling equilibrium. Conﬂict of interest prevents full information aggregation also
in larger committees, as shown by Maug and Yilmaz [2002]. These authors suggest to group
voters into two separate classes because such a voting mechanism may alleviate the incentive
to withhold information when voters have strong conﬂicts of interests and individual infor-
mation diﬀers. Thus, voting decisions become more informative. Examining a committee
of experts, Wolinsky [2002] suggests to solve the problem in a similar way, by partitioning
members in diﬀerent groups6.
In most of the above-mentioned studies there is some communication among committee
members. Indeed, since the seminal contribution by Austen-Smith [1990], information sharing
and voting insmall committees is often analyzed along with the possibility of communication7.
This strand of literature has been recently and very elegantly reviewed by Austen-Smith and
Feddersen [2009]. In particular, they focus on the role of communication, along with voting
rules and voting protocols, to foster full information aggregation in small committees.
In our model of simultaneous voting, however, the optimal voting strategy already nests
information sharing, and the role of communication, though important, is very limited. In
fact, we take a diﬀerent approach to the problem of information sharing among committee
members by examining if the voting outcome can be optimal even if some members do not
communicate any information at all. In our model, there is preference heterogeneity in the
sense that some members genuinely want to aggregate information while others have a strong
bias. Without imposing any explicit revelation mechanism and without looking for optimal
voting rules or protocols, we suggest an optimal composition rule as a suﬃcient device to
provide the highest possible level of information aggregation, even when biased members do
not use their private information. The positive role of the latter members in our model does
not rely on their superior information with respect to value maximizers, but on the fact that
their presence on the committee eliminates multiple (and possibly suboptimal) equilibria.
Communication, when it is possible, serves as a coordination device but does not add value
to the decision making.
3 The model
A committee is composed of 2n + 1,n ≥ 1, members who have to decide by majority vote
whether to approve a project (voting “yes”) or reject it (voting “no”). If the proposal is
6Committee members have heterogeneous preferences also in the model of Cai [2009]. The focus of Cai,
however, is the optimal size of the committee rather than its composition.
7See also Adams and Ferreira [2007], Harris and Raviv [2008], and Raheja [2005] for communication in
boards of directors.
4rejected, a value of 0 is realized. When accepted, the project yields value v = −1 if the state
of the world is low (L), and v = 1 if the state of the world is high (H). Thus, v : {−1,1}.
Each state, and thus each value, has the same prior (i.e., 1
2). This implies that when
members have no information on the state of the world there is no one choice that dominates
the other. Given these probabilities, the highest expected value that can be achieved by
voting correctly (rejecting the project in L and approving it in H) is 1
2. Note that a single
uninformed decision maker would always obtain an expected value of 0.
We consider a simple information structure where any member of the committee learns
the true state with probability α ∈ [1
2,1) and learns nothing with probability 1 − α.8 As a
consequence, the information set of a generic member i is Ωi = {ωi}, with ωi ∈ {H;L}, when
i is informed, while it is Ωi = {H,L}, when i does not know the true state of the world.
Furthermore, we consider the case in which committee members can become informed at
no cost. As we will point out at the end of section 3, assuming a ﬁxed cost for acquiring
information would leave our results on the voting outcome and committee composition un-
changed. Introducing such a cost would however set an upper bound to the optimal size of
the committee.
We initially assume that members cannot communicate. Then, in Section 6, we relax
this assumption, showing that even if we allow for communication, the performance of the
committee does not improve. In addition, as usual in the literature on committee voting,
we do not consider abstention9. Given that abstention is not allowed, the action set of each
player has only two elements: vote “yes” to accept the project and “no” to reject it. A
strategy si is a member i’s voting behavior, conditional on his information set. A mixed
strategy is deﬁned as the probability that a member votes “yes”.
The committee is composed of unbiased members who want to maximize the expected
value of the project, E(v), and of biased members who always want to approve the project
independently of the state of the world. We assume that all members are risk neutral and
that their types are common knowledge. Let M denote value-maximizing members, and
B members with a bias. Then, we call m and b the probabilities of voting “yes” for an
8Alternatively, we can assume that every member observes a signal that is perfectly informative with
probability α and with probability 1 − α is totally noisy. Referring to this interpretation, it can be shown
that our results would not qualitatively change if the signal was only partially noisy (Balduzzi [2005]).
9Of course we acknowledge some exceptions, such as Morton and Tyran (2008). Nonetheless, for our
heterogeneous committee this assumption is made without loss of generality, because members would never
abstain in equilibrium. Furthermore, allowing abstention would bring other issues and restrictions into the
picture, driving the attention away from the scope of the paper. First of all, it is not clear what should happen
when everyone abstains. An ad hoc rule should be applied that however might aﬀect the ﬁnal result. Second,
it is not clear what the general decision rule should be: simple majority of members or simple majority of
actual votes? Note also that in many committees abstention is explicitly or implicitly ruled out (juries, the
European Courts of Human Rights and the Italian Constitutional Court are some examples).
5uninformed member of type M and B respectively.
The utility function of a M type positively depends on the expected value of the project;
in particular, we assume that it actually corresponds to its expected value: uM(E(v)) = E(v).
Given this utility function, a M member will choose the strategy that maximizes E(v). Notice
that, given the values the project can take, maximizing E(v) is equivalent to maximizing the
probability that the committee takes the correct decision. Indeed, the latter is given by the
sum of the probabilities that “yes” wins when the actual value of the alternative is 1 and
that “no” wins when the actual value of the alternative is −1:
1
2
{Y (· | v = 1) + [1 − Y (· | v = −1)]},
where the function Y (·|·) is the conditional probability that the board as a whole votes “yes”.




[1Y (·|v = 1) − 1Y (·|v = −1)]
and it is straightforward to notice that the two expressions are strategically equivalent.
In order to maximize E(v), a M member will condition his strategy on being pivotal,
because that is the only case where he can actually inﬂuence the outcome of the voting
process and therefore his own utility. Since any strategy is optimal when the player is not
pivotal, we concentrate on weakly dominant strategies without loss of generality.
The utility function of a B member positively depends on the approval of the project10.
A B member always supports the project, regardless of the value which is ex post realized.
His utility uB therefore depends on the ﬁnal decision of the committee and can take the
following two values: uB = 1 if the project is approved and uB = 0 if the project is rejected.
This clearly implies that always voting “yes” is a dominant strategy for a B member. For
simplicity, we abstract from additional problems, such as a B member’s potential loss of
reputation when the approval of the project creates a loss.
Finally, before analyzing the voting behavior of the committee, we introduce the deﬁnition
of compensating strategy that will be useful in the following sections.
Deﬁnition 1 (Compensating strategy) Two members are playing compensating strate-
gies when the following conditions are jointly satisﬁed: i) they are both uninformed; ii) they
play “yes” with probabilities whose sum is equal to 1. When these probabilities take extreme
values (0 and 1), we have compensation in pure strategies.
10Obviously, nothing substantial in our results would change if a biased member always supported rejection.
6We concentrate on equilibria where members of the same type follow the same type of
strategy, i. e. either they all play pure strategies or they all play mixed strategies.
4 The benchmark
We deﬁne our benchmark as a committee only composed of members who want to maximize
E(v), i.e. members of type M. Clearly, whenever a M member is informed, he votes accord-
ing to his information. The issue is to deﬁne what an uninformed M member should do.
Intuitively, any uninformed member has an incentive to leave the ﬁnal decision to the others,
who may be informed. It can then be shown that there are only two types of equilibria
diﬀering as to the behavior of uninformed members.
The ﬁrst is an (asymmetric) equilibrium in pure strategies, where all but one member
compensate for each other when uninformed, while the remaining member plays indiﬀerently
either “yes” or “no”(when uninformed). As the identity of those members who vote “yes”
in equilibrium and those who vote “no” is interchangeable, there exists in fact a multiplicity
of such equilibria all of which yield the same expected value. No symmetric equilibrium in
pure strategies is possible. The second is a (symmetric) equilibrium where all the members
compensate for each other in mixed strategies, voting “yes” with probability 1/2.
In order to better understand the nature of the asymmetric equilibrium, consider a simple
example with α = 1
2 and n = 2, so that there are ﬁve members Mi, i = 1,2,3,4,5. Suppose
that four members vote “yes” when uninformed. The remaining member knows that he is
pivotal only if two members vote “no”. But, given the above strategies, this happens only if
the two members who vote “no” are in fact informed. Then, the remaining member should
vote “no”. This tells us that there cannot exist a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies
where everybody votes “yes” (neither, by the same argument, an equilibriumwhere everybody
votes “no”). Moreover, it immediately appears that a situation where four members vote
“yes” (or “no”), when uninformed, cannot be an equilibrium: voting “yes” (“no”) is not the
best response for an uninformed individual when there are already three members following
the “yes” strategy. His best response is to vote the opposite of another uninformed member,
thus giving rise to the asymmetric equilibrium. Once there are three members voting “yes”
and two members voting “no”, nobody has an incentive to change his strategy. Consider one
of those member voting “yes”. The probability that he is pivotal is the same in both states
so he is indiﬀerent between voting “yes” or “no”.
The expected value of these equilibria can be easily computed. In the case where two



















which is clearly equal to the value that obtains if three members vote “yes” when uninformed,


















Notice that, in the spirit of Condorcet, the expected value is bigger than the value obtained
by a single decision maker (0). Still, this committee does not provide full aggregation of
information (yielding E(v)FI = 1
2) In other words, the committee does not always take the
correct decision. When all the members are uninformed, the decision (whatever it is) is
correct with probability 1/2. Moreover the decision is wrong with probability 1/2 if the only
informed members are those voting according to the actual state even if uninformed (those
choosing mi = 1 if uninformed when the actual state is v = 1, or those choosing mi = 0 if
uninformed when the actual state is v = 0).
Consider now the second type of equilibrium where all the uninformed members com-
pensate for each other in (symmetric) mixed strategies. Intuitively, in this equilibrium any
member randomizes as long as he is pivotal in both states of the world with the same prob-
ability, given the other members’ strategies. But this is simultaneously true for any single
member only if all the members are pivotal in each state of the world with the same prob-
ability. The only proﬁle which is compatible with this logic is then the one where all the
members compensate for each other in mixed strategies, voting “yes” with probability 1/2.
This argument rules out any other possible equilibria in mixed strategies: whenever a mem-
ber is not indiﬀerent between voting “yes” or “no” (because the probability of that he is
pivotal in a state is higher than the probability that he is pivotal in another state), he plays
a pure strategy. But then, other members will have an incentive to deviate from any mixed
strategy to compensate for his pure strategy. Again, we can easily compute the expected




















Thus, the expected value falls short of that obtainable in the pure strategy equilibrium.
Recall that we focus on equilibria where all the members follow the same type of strategy,
i. e. either they all play pure strategies or they all play mixed strategies, then Proposition 1
8generalizes our ﬁndings.
Proposition 1 (Benchmark) In a voting game with 2n + 1 members of type M, informed
members always play according to their information. There exist two types of equilibria
diﬀering as to the behavior of uninformed players : i) n players always vote “no”, n players
always vote “yes”, and one player chooses m ∈ {0,1}; ii) 2n + 1 players randomize with
probability 1
2. Equilibria of type i) yield expected value E(v)∗ = 1
2[1 − (1 − α)n+1]. Equilibria
of type ii) yield a lower expected value.
The intuition for this result is the same as in the ﬁve-member case: uninformed members
do not want to inﬂuence the outcome of the voting process, so they compensate for each
other, and leave the ﬁnal decision to possibly informed members. This is also what happens
in the second kind of equilibria where uninformed players compensate for each other in mixed
strategies. Compensation is more eﬀective when played in pure strategies, as it is realized
with probability one: E(v) is higher in the asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies than in
symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies. Then, in what follows we take the level of E(v)∗
as our benchmark.
Deﬁnition 2 Any equilibrium that yields E(v)∗ = 1
2[1 − (1 − α)n+1] is deﬁned optimal.
Notice that (1−α)n+1is the probability that the decision is wrong, given by the probability
that all the members are uninformed, plus the probability that the only informed members
are those voting according to the actual state even if uninformed (those choosing mi = 1 if
uninformed when the actual state is v = 1, or those choosing mi = 0 if uninformed when the
actual state is v = −1).11
Just for illustration, we draw in Graph 1 and 2 the relationship between E(v) and the
probability of having informed members (α), in committees with ﬁve and nine members. In
both graphs, we compare the optimal pure strategy equilibrium outcome (thin line) with the
11That (1−α)n+1 represents the probability of making the wrong decision is shown in the proof of Propo-
sition 1, point iii).
9symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium outcome (thick line).
Graph 1: E(v) and α in the ﬁve-member committee









Graph 2: E(v) and α in the nine-member committee









The graphs show a positive relationship between E(v) and α in both equilibria. They also
show that the mixed strategy equilibrium never yields a higher expected value than the pure
strategy one. When all the members are informed (α = 1), there is no diﬀerence between the
two equilibria and E(v) is the same. It is also clear that E(v) is growing in n. These relations
are formalized by Corollary 1 which immediately follows from E(v)∗ = 1
2[1 − (1 − α)n+1]
Corollary 1 When an optimal equilibrium is played, E(v)∗ is increasing both in n and in α
at a decreasing rate.
The positive relation between E(v)∗ and n may induce into thinking that the optimal
size of the committee is unbounded. In the present paper we do not address the issue of the
optimal committee size. We take the size as exogenous since it is likely to be determined on
the ground of other criteria than the optimality of the voting behavior of the committee12.
12For example, the need to represent diﬀerent stakeolders or to balance diﬀerent powers or just plain
political criteria.
10Notice however that a limit to the optimal size of the board is immediately imposed if we
remove our simplifying assumption that information is costless. Consider for example the
case where each member has to pay a cost c in order to obtain information with probability
α. Given that the expected value is increasing in n at a decreasing rate, the size of the
committee must not be too large in order for all the members to acquire information13.
5 Heterogeneous preferences
Having deﬁned the optimal equilibrium, we compare this benchmark to the outcome of a
committee composed of members with heterogeneous preferences. Consider again a com-
mittee with ﬁve members (n = 2), in the case where α = 1
2, but let now members be
either of type M or of B. If B members hold the majority, the case is trivial because the
committee always approves the project and the M members are never pivotal. Then, we
concentrate on the remaining two interesting cases in which the committee is composed of :
i) four value-maximizing members Mi, i = 1,2,3,4, and one biased member B5; and ii) three
value-maximizing members Mi, i = 1,2,3, and two biased members Bj, j = 4,5.
We start from the latter case and we show that there exists a unique equilibrium. Given
that B members always vote “yes”, independently of their information, M members vote
according to their information whenever informed, and vote “no” when they are uninformed.
Such rejection is optimal, because the probability that an uninformed member is pivotal is















Quite surprisingly, the performance of this committee is the same as the optimal performance
of the committee composed of unbiased members only. In addition, this equilibrium is unique.
Thus, we can say that the heterogeneous committee ensures the optimal outcome, provided
that the M members outnumber B members by just one vote.
Consider now the case where the committee is composed of Mi, i = 1,2,3,4, and B5.
Recall that the dominant strategy of an informed M member is to vote according to his
information, and that of the unique B member is to always approve the project. Then,
two types of equilibria emerge, diﬀering as to the behavior of uninformed M members. In
the equilibria of the ﬁrst type, two of the M members compensate for each other in pure
13Since we know from the proof of Corollary 1 that the increase in the expected value is equal to α
2(1−α)n+1,
it immediately appears that the size of the committee must not exceed 2n+1 where n is the smallest integer
such that: α
2(1 − α)n+1 ≥ c. See Balduzzi, Graziano, Luporini [2011]. The idea that information costs may
set a limit to the size of a committee is not new in the literature. See for example Harris and Raviv (2008).
11strategies when uninformed, and the other two M members vote “no”. In the equilibrium of
the second type, all of the four M members play the same mixed strategy, when uninformed.















the equilibrium of the second type is suboptimal. We ﬁnd in fact the following solution:













Intuitively, when the M members outnumber the B members by more than one, the former
have two possible choices. Either one single member oﬀsets the bias of B5 in pure strategies
and the remaining members compensate for each other in pure strategies, or all of the M
members play the same mixed strategy with the aim to collectively contrast the bias of B5.
This is the reason why the symmetric mixed strategy of the M members in the second type
of equilibrium is now biased towards rejection, mi > 1/2, i = 1,2,3,4.
Proposition 2 generalizes these results.
Proposition 2 Consider a committee with 2n + 1 members where members of type B al-
ways approve the project and informed members of type M always vote according to their
information. We can distinguish two cases:
i) if there are n members of type B and n+1 members of type M the game has a unique
equilibrium in which all the members of type M always vote “no” when uninformed. This
unique equilibrium is optimal;
ii) if there are n − k members of type B (n > k > 0) and n + 1 + k members of type
M, the voting game may have multiple equilibria. There always exists an optimal equilibrium
where 2k members of type M compensate for each other in pure strategies and the remaining
n − k + 1 members of type M vote “no” when uninformed.
From the above proposition, Corollary 2 immediately follows.





For a given size of the committee, increasing the proportion of the M members is not
proﬁtable, provided they already hold the majority. By increasing the proportion of the
M members, optimal equilibria can still be obtained but there may also exist other kind of
12equilibria. Thus, if value-maximizing members outnumber biased members by only one vote,
the situation is greatly simpliﬁed with respect to our benchmark case because the optimal
equilibrium is unique.
We know from Corollary 1 that increasing the size of the committee (increasing n), in-
creases E(v)∗, when the optimal equilibrium is played. Since an increase in n may now result
in an increase in the number of the B members, this point deserves some attention. Consider




[Y (·|v = 1) − Y (·|v = −1)].
The probability of approving the project when the state of nature is unfavorable Y (·|v = −1)
is still equal to zero after an increase in n, because the eﬀect of additional biased members
is compensated for by the M members voting “no” when uninformed. On the contrary,
the probability of approving the project when it is proﬁtable, Y (·|v = 1), increases with n,
because it is equal to the probability that at least one of the n + 1 members of type M is
informed. Hence adding new members (including biased ones) is proﬁtable14.
6 Voting outcome with communication
So far we have assumed that the members of the committee do not communicate prior to
voting. On the one hand, this is clearly not crucial for biased members; on the other hand,
unbiased members may have a strong incentive to share their information. In this section,
we examine the eﬀect of communication in a committee with both types of members.
Communication is introduced as a pre-voting stage where members of type M send costless
messages about their information sets. Recall that the information set of a generic member i
is Ωi = {ωi}, with ωi ∈ {H;L}, when i is informed, and Ωi = {H,L} when i is uninformed.
Consequently, member i can send a message σi ∈ {ωi;0}, where σi = 0 means that i sends no
information. Messages are simultaneously exchanged among unbiased members and update
their information sets15. Finally, we assume that an informed member, whenever indiﬀerent,
sends a truthful message.
When communication is possible, equilibrium strategies are as follows.
14Clearly our comment on the optimal size of the committee following Corollary 1 still applies.
15Alternatively we can assume that messages are exchanged among all the members and enter everybody’s
information set. Notice however that biased members cannot commit to send truthful messages because of
their strong bias. Thus, they would never be believed. This is equivalent to assuming that they do not send
any message, i.e. σB = 0. On the other hand members of type B, given their preferences, would not change
their strategies even if they received a message revealing that the state of nature is L. For these reasons we
focus on the message strategies of the M members.
13Proposition 3 In a committee with n members of type B and n + 1 members of type M
who can communicate, there exist multiple equilibria all of which yield the optimal outcome
E(v)∗ = 1
2[1−(1−α)n+1]. Each informed M member sends a truthful message and then votes
according to his information; each uninformed M member receiving at least one σi = L votes
according to the received message(s), and indiﬀerently votes either “yes” or “no” otherwise.
Quite surprisingly, communication does not improve the outcome of the voting game as
long as the number of unbiased members is n + 1 and the number of biased members is n.
Propositions 2 and 3 imply that the expected value of the project reaches the same level
E(v)∗ = 1
2[1 − (1 − α)n+1] independently of communication.
If the number of unbiased members is kept constant, the eﬀect of allowing communication
is null because the right decision is made with probability 1 when at least one M member
is informed and with probability 1
2 when no M member is informed. But this is precisely
what happens in the case without communication. Indeed, the voting strategies of the M
members in the case with no communication (contrasting biased members and leaving the
decision to possibly informed members) minimize the information required to reach the best
possible outcome, E(v)∗.
The introduction of communication results in the expansion of the set of equilibria. When
no information is revealed, M members now know that nobody is actually informed and thus
have no strategic reason to contrast biased members and make other unbiased members
pivotal. They can indiﬀerently cast any vote and thus multiple equilibria arise: there now
also exist equilibria where some unbiased members vote “no” after observing σi = H. These
additional equilibria may entail an unconvincing behavior on the part of the M members,
nonetheless they all yield16 E(v)∗ = 1
2[1 − (1 − α)n+1].
Another diﬀerence with the no communication case lies in the fact that the proportion
of B and M members is now undetermined: as long as the latter hold the majority, the
proportion is irrelevant for the optimal equilibrium to be reached. When communication
is not allowed, biased members play the role of a coordination device for uninformed M
members: as all M members vote “no” when uninformed, E(v)∗ is reached. To this end, it
is crucial that M members outnumber B members exactly by one. When communication is
possible, instead, there is no need of a coordination device. It suﬃces that one member of
type M observes the state of nature, for are all the unbiased members to vote correctly. We
can then conclude that, for a given number of M members, communication cannot improve
on already optimal equilibria but rules out sub-optimal ones. As there is a positive relation
16Notice that, contrary to what happens in the type ii) equilibria of proposition 1, this multiplicity does
not entail any coordination problem: whatever the choice of the M members receiving message σi = H, an
equilibrium with expected value E(v)∗ is reached.
14between n and E(v)∗, it is now proﬁtable to raise the proportion of unbiased members as
much as possible.
7 Conclusions
We have analyzed the voting behavior of a small committee that has to approve or reject
a project whose return is uncertain. Members have heterogenous preferences: some mem-
bers want to maximize the expected value while others have a bias towards project approval
and disregard their private information. More precisely, we have shown that, in the ab-
sence of communication among members, heterogeneous committees can function at least
as well as committees with homogeneous value-maximizing members. In particular, when
value maximizers outnumber biased members by just one vote, the presence of biased mem-
bers can improve the voting outcome by simplifying the strategies of the value maximizers:
the equilibrium becomes unique and yields the optimal outcome. Increasing the number of
value-maximizing members above the minimum that ensures majority does not increase the
expected value and gives rise to additional suboptimal equilibria. For a given number of
value maximizers, even allowing for communication among members does not improve the
outcome. With communication, however, the number of biased members becomes irrelevant,
provided they still are the minority. Thus, our model suggests that committee composition
is particularly important when communication among members is limited.
Despite being quite simple, we believe our framework can be easily applied to explain
voting behaviors in a number of diﬀerent small decisional bodies such as monetary policy
committees, juries, boards of directors, and so on. In all of these committees, it is not
uncommon to observe dissent voting. We explain such dissent as the result of optimal voting
strategies, given an optimal composition rule of the committee itself. Furthermore, our
result shows that the composition actually used in some small committees (for instance, in
the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee or the Italian Constitutional Court) is
optimal if members are diverse and communication is limited.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First, each informed member votes according to his information, as this maximizes the prob-
ability of making the correct decision. Thus, in what follows we only focus on the voting
strategies of uninformed members. Second, recall that value-maximizing members choose
15their strategies as if they were pivotal, as what they do when they are not pivotal is ir-
relevant for the voting outcome. Thus, we concentrate on equilibria in weakly dominant
strategies. Third, we focus on equilibria where either all the members play pure strategies or
all the members play mixed strategies.
Considering a committee composed of 2n + 1 members of type M, we prove that there only
exist i) multiple equilibria with compensation in pure strategies ii) a unique equilibrium with
compensation in mixed strategies. Finally, we prove that equilibria of type i) maximize E(v).
i) There exist multiple equilibria where n members choose mj = 1, n members
choose mz = 0, and one member, denoted by Mi i ￿= j,z, chooses mi ∈ {0,1}.
We prove the existence of these equilibria in four steps. First we prove that player i is
voting optimally, given the strategies of the other 2n players; then we prove that the other
2n members are voting optimally as well (steps 2 and 3). Finally, we prove that these are
the only equilibria in pure strategies of the game.
1. If n members choose mj = 1, n members choose mz = 0, the best response of Mi, i ￿= j,z,
is to choose mi ∈ {0,1}.
When n members are voting “yes” and n members are voting “no” Mi is pivotal in both states
of the world with the same probability. Indeed, when v = 1, Mi is pivotal when everybody
else is uninformed or when the only informed members are those n members who would vote
“yes” even if uninformed (thus not changing their votes whether informed or not). As the













= (1 − α)
n.
where n!
j!(n−j)! represents the number of combination with n−j informed members among the
n members who vote “yes” if uninformed, and the term in brackets is equal to 1 from the
binomial theorem. When v = −1, Mi is pivotal when everybody else is uninformed or when
the only informed members are those who would vote “no” even if uninformed. Then the
probability that Mi is pivotal is again (1 − α)n.
Hence, Mi is indiﬀerent between the two possible values of mi ∈ {0,1}.
2. If n members choose mj = 1, n − 1 members choose mz = 0, and member Mi, i ￿= j,z,
chooses mi = 0 the best response of the remaining member (denoted by k, k ￿= i,j,z) is to
choose mk ∈ {0,1}; if Mi, chooses mi = 1 the best response of Mk is to choose mk = 0.
If Mi chooses mi = 0, we are back to point 1. So the optimal response of the remaining
Mk is mk ∈ {0,1}. If instead Mi chooses mi = 1, then Mk is pivotal only when v = −1.
Consequently, choosing mk = 0 is a weakly dominant strategy for Mk.
3. If n − 1 members choose mj = 1, n members choose mz = 0, and member Mi, i ￿= j,z,
16chooses mi = 1 the best response of the remaining member (denoted by k, k ￿= i,j,z) is to
choose mk ∈ {0,1}; if Mi, chooses mi = 0 the best response of Mk is to choose mk = 1.
The argument is symmetric to the one used at point 2.
Finally, note that any member can be in the position of Mi, or in that of an Mj voting
“yes” or also in that of an Mz voting “no” when uninformed. Thus, there is a multiplicity of
equilibria such as the one we are considering.
4. There are no other equilibria in pure strategies.
Consider what happens if more than n members vote “yes”, i.e. suppose n + k members
(k ∈ {1,2,3,...,n − 1}) choose mj = 1. Then every remaining member knows that he is
pivotal with a higher probability when v = −1. Hence, the remaining n − k − 1 members
choose mz = 0. However, this cannot be an equilibrium. Also members voting mj = 1 know
that they are pivotal with a higher probability when v = −1. Hence, as long as more than
n members still vote “yes” when uninformed (k ￿= 0), they have an incentive to change their
strategy and vote “no” when uninformed.
A symmetric argument can be used to analyze what happens if more than n members
vote “no” when uninformed, i.e. if n + k members (k ∈ {1,2,3,...,n − 1}) choose mz = 0
and consequently to rule out the existence of other equilibria in pure strategies.
ii): There exists a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies where all the 2n + 1
members choose mj = 1
2.
We prove the existence of this equilibrium in two steps.
1. If 2n members choose mj = 1
2, the best response of the remaining member (denoted by i,
i ￿= j) is to choose mi = 1
2.
Both when v = 1 and when v = −1, Mi is pivotal if a) everybody is uninformed and n
members vote “yes” while the other n members vote “no”, or b) no more than n members are
informed and vote accordingly, while uninformed members vote in such a way that results in
n members voting “yes” and n members voting “no”. Given that the other members choose
mj = 1
2, Mi is pivotal with the same probability in both states of the world. Since both
states are equally possible, Mi is then indiﬀerent among any mi ∈ [0,1].
As this holds true for every member, it immediately follows that mj = 1
2 for j = 1,...2n+1,
sustains an equilibrium of the game.
2. If at least one member chooses mi ￿= 1
2, there is at least one member who has a pure strategy
as his best response. Consequently there cannot exist an equilibrium in mixed strategies with
mi ￿= 1
2 for one or more members
If Mi were to choose mi > 1
2 while 2n − 1 members choose mj = 1
2, the best response of
the remaining member denoted by k, k ￿= i,j, would be mk = 0, because Mk would be pivotal
with a higher probability when v = −1 than when v = 1. With 2n − 1 members choosing
17mj = 1
2 and Mk choosing mk = 0, however the best response of Mi becomes mi = 1, because
Mi would be pivotal with a higher probability in v = 1 than in v = −1.
Symmetrically if Mi were to choose mi < 1
2, while 2n − 1 members choose mj = 1
2, the
best response of the remaining member denoted by k ￿= i,j, would be mk = 1, and with
2n−1 members choosing mj = 1
2 and Mk choosing mk = 1, the best response of Mi becomes
mi = 0.
A similar argument holds true if member Mi choosing mi > 1
2 were compensated by
another member, denoted by h, choosing mh < 1
2 and such that mi + mh = 1. In this case
no other member has an incentive to deviate from mj = 1
2, but it immediately appears that
mh < 1
2 is not a best response. Given that Mh is pivotal with a higher probability in v = −1
than in v = 1, his best response is mh = 0.
More generally, by applying the same line of reasoning, it can be veriﬁed that there cannot
exist an equilibrium with mi ￿= 1
2 for at least one i, because as soon as one or more agents
choose mi ￿= 1
2, there is at least one agent (possibly one of those choosing mi ￿= 1
2) who has a
pure strategy as his best response. Hence the only equilibrium in pure strategies is the one
with mi = 1
2 for i = 1,2...2n + 1.
iii) The equilibria in pure strategies maximize E(v)
In order to compare the expected value obtained in a pure strategy equilibrium to that








[1 − Y (·|v = −1) − (1 − Y (·|v = 1)].
where Y (·|v = −1) + (1 − Y (·|v = 1) is the probability of making the wrong decision.





1 − (1 − α)
n+1￿
.
Consider the speciﬁcation of the pure strategy equilibrium where 2n members compensate
for each other in pure strategies and the remaining member chooses mz = 0. In this case
Y (·|v = −1) = 0 while (1−Y (·|v = 1) = (1−α)n+1 as the probability of rejecting the project
when v = 1 is equal to the probability that those n + 1 members who choose mz = 0 are
uninformed (see point i). Symmetrically, in the pure strategy equilibrium where 2n members
compensate for each other in pure strategies and the remaining member chooses mj = 1,
Y (·|v = −1) = (1 − α)n+1 while (1 − Y (·|v = 1) = 0. Hence E(v)PS = 1
2 [1 − (1 − α)n+1].









































is Y (·|v = −1) = (1 − Y (·|v = 1), i.e. the probability that at least n + 1 members do not
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it follows that E(v)MS < E(v)PS.
8.2 Proof of Corollary 1




























which is clearly decreasing in n.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 2
First, each informed M member votes according to his information, as this maximizes the
probability of making the correct decision. Thus, in what follows we only focus on the voting
strategies of uninformed members. Second, recall that M members choose their strategies as
if they were pivotal, as what they do when they are not pivotal is irrelevant for the voting
outcome. Thus, we concentrate on equilibria in weakly dominant strategies. Thirdly, we
focus on equilibria where either all of the M members choose pure strategies or all of the M
19members choose mixed strategies. The proof is organized as follows; we prove that:
i) if the committee is composed of n+1 value-maximizing members and n biased members,
there exists a unique equilibrium where each M member votes “no” when uninformed;
ii1) if the committee is composed of n + 1 + k value-maximizing members and n − k
biased members, there always exist equilibria where n − k value-maximizing members vote
“no” when uninformed and the remaining 2k value-maximizing members compensate for each
other in pure strategies. These are the only pure strategy equilibria of the voting game;
ii2) if the committee is composed of n+1+k value-maximizing members and n−k biased
members, there may exist equilibria where all the n+1+k value-maximizing members play
the same mixed strategy;
iii) the equilibria in pure strategies (sub i) and sub ii1)) are optimal.
i) In a committee with n + 1 value-maximizing members and n biased members
there exists a unique equilibrium where all the M members vote “no” whenever
uninformed (that is, mi = 0;i = 1,2,...,n + 1).
Consider member Mn+1.
When v = 1, Mn+1 is pivotal only if all the other M members are uninformed and vote “no”,






When v = −1, Mn+1 is pivotal if:






- all the other M members are informed, which happens with probability
α
n,
- at least one (but not all) of the other M members is informed and the others vote “no”












h!(n−h)! represents the number of combination with h uninformed value-maximizing
20members and n− h informed value-maximizing members. It is straightforward that Mn+1 is
pivotal with a higher probability when v = −1. Hence Mn+1 chooses mn+1 = 0. As the same
reasoning holds for any other value-maximizing member i ￿= n + 1, it follows that every M
member will vote “no” when uninformed.
Finally, note that we have not restricted mi, i ￿= n + 1, to any particular value, so the
result also proves that this equilibrium is unique.
ii1) In the case of n−k biased members (n > k > 0) and n+1+k value-maximizing
members, there exist multiple equilibria with n−k+1 value-maximizing members
voting against the project and 2k value-maximizing members compensating for
each other.
We prove the existence of these equilibria in three steps. In the ﬁrst step, we prove that
when n − k value-maximizing members vote against the project and 2k value-maximizing
members compensate for each other, the remaining M member has still an incentive to
vote against the project; in the second step, we prove that when n − k value-maximizing
members vote against the project to contrast the n−k insiders, and a majority of the other
value-maximizing members also vote against the project, the remaining M member has an
incentive to compensate, voting “yes”. Finally, we show that there are no other equilibria in
pure strategies.
1. If n value-maximizing members choose mz = 0, and k value-maximizing members choose
mj = 1, the best response of Mi, i ￿= j,z, is to choose mi = 0.
When v = 1, Mi is pivotal if all the value-maximizing members are uninformed or if at least
one of those k value-maximizing members who choose mj = 1 when uninformed, is in fact












= (1 − α)
n
where k!
j!(k−j)! represents the number of combination with j uninformed value-maximizing
members, k − j informed M members and the term in brackets is equal to 1 from the
binomial theorem. When v = −1, Mi is pivotal if all the M members are uninformed or if
at least one of those n value-maximizing members who choose mz = 0 when uninformed, is












= (1 − α)
k
Given that (1 − α)k > (1 − α)n, the probability that Mi is pivotal is higher when v = −1
21than when v = 1. Hence Mi chooses mi = 0.
2. If n+1 value-maximizing members choose mz = 0 and k − 1 value-maximizing members
choose mj = 1, the best response of Mi, i ￿= j,z is to choose mi = 1
When v = 1, Mi is pivotal if only one of the n + 1 value-maximizing members choosing
mz = 0 is informed and votes “yes”. This happens with probability
(n + 1)(1 − α)
nα.
On the contrary, Mi is never pivotal when v = −1. Hence, he chooses mi = 1.
Finally, note that any M member can be in the position of Mi or in that of an Mj voting
“yes”, or also in that of an Mz voting “no”. Thus, there is a multiplicity of equilibria such
as the one we are considering.
3. There cannot exist other equilibria in pure strategies than those characterized at points 1
and 2.
We must now consider what happens if either a) more than n value-maximizing members
vote “no” and the others vote “yes”, or b) more than k value-maximizing members vote “yes”
and the rest vote “no”.
a) If n − h value-maximizing members choose mz = 0, and k + h value-maximizing
members choose mj = 1, n ≥ h > 0, the best response of Mi, i ￿= j,z, is to choose mi = 0
because Mi is never pivotal when v = 1 while he may be pivotal when v = −1. This happens in
the case where h of those n+h value-maximizing members who choose mj = 1 if uninformed,
are in fact informed. As this is true for any h > 0, we are back to the case examined at point
1 above.
b) If n + h value-maximizing members choose mz = 0, and k − h value-maximizing
members choose mj = 1, k ≥ h > 1, the best response of Mi, i ￿= j,z, is to choose mi = 1
because Mi is never pivotal when v = −1 while he may be pivotal when v = 1. This happens in
the case where h of those n+h value-maximizing members who choose mz = 0 if uninformed,
are in fact informed. As this is true for any h > 1, we are back to the case examined at point
2 above.
ii2) In the case of n−k biased members (n > k > 0) and n+1+k value-maximizing
members, there may exist equilibria where all the M members choose the same
mixed strategy.






[Y (·|v = 1) − Y (·|v = −1)]
s.t. mi ∈ (0,1)
mi = mj,∀j ￿= i i,j = 1,2....n + k + 1
Bz always votes “yes” z = 1,..n − k
where the ﬁrst constraint refers to the fact that we are looking for a mixed strategy (i.e.,
an internal solution), the second constraint imposes the symmetry of this strategy, and the
third constraint takes into account that any B member follows his dominant strategy.
We have solved this problem for a committee of ﬁve members, one of type B (hence, B1
always votes “yes”) and the remaining four of type M. To make the maximization problem





[Y (·|v = 1) − Y (·|v = −1)],
where





[α + (1 − α)m]
5−i[(1 − α)(1 − m)]
i−1
is the probability that the committee votes “yes” when v = 1, member B always votes “yes”,
and all of the four M members choose the same mixed strategy m. Analogously,






5−i[α + (1 − α)(1 − m)]
i−1.
The solution of the problem, evaluated at α = 1
2, is:






We do not characterize the solution for diﬀerent values of α, committee size or composition
as it is suﬃcient to our purpose to show that such an equilibrium may exist.





[Y (·|v = 1) − Y (·|v = −1)].
In the unique equilibrium of the case with n biased members and n + 1 value-maximizing
members (point i), as well as in the pure strategy equilibrium of the case with n − k biased
23members (n > k > 0) and n+1 +k value-maximizing members (point ii1), Y (·|v = −1) = 0
and Y (·|v = 1) is equal to the probability that at least one of the n+1 members who choose













1 − (1 − α)
n+1￿
implying that the pure-strategy equilibria are optimal.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 3
With probability (1 − α)n+1 no Mi is informed, i = 1,2,...,n + 1, whereas with probability
1 − (1 − α)n+1, at least one member, say Mj, obtains information and consequently sends a
truthful message σMj = ωMj. In the latter case, subsequent voting strategies are straight-
forward: Mi votes according to his information and all Mi￿=j vote according to the received
information. More precisely, if the revealed information is σMj = L, each unbiased member
is pivotal and votes “no”. On the contrary, if the revealed information is σMj = H, those
unbiased members who receive the message are no longer pivotal (as the correct decision
has already been made) and, given that the sender votes “yes”, can cast any vote. The ar-
gument immediately generalizes to the case where more than one unbiased member obtains
information.
When instead no member is informed, any Mi chooses mi ∈ {0,1}. Given equal priors
about the states of the world, utility is independent of mi, so any probability mi ∈ {0,1} is
utility maximizing for Mi.
To formally characterize the equilibrium strategy of the generic member Mi, recall that
sMi is Mi’s strategy proﬁle. Thus, it follows that the equilibrium (weakly dominant) strategy







1 | ΩMi = {ωMi = H};
0 | ΩMi = {ωMi = L};ΩMi = {σMj = L};




where j ￿= i, i,j = 1,2,.....n + 1.




[Y (·|v = 1) − Y (·|v = −1)] =
1
2
[1 − Y (·|v = −1) − (1 − Y (·|v = 1)]
where Y (·|v = −1) + (1 − Y (·|v = 1) is the probability of making the wrong decision.
24Considering this is now equal to the probability that no M member is informed, (1 − α)n+1,





1 − (1 − α)
n+1￿
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